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Abstract Preconception care to address genetic risks in
reproduction may be offered either individually to couples
with a known or suspected increased risk of having a child
with a genetic disorder, or systematically to couples or
individuals of reproductive age. The identification of cou-
ples at risk of transmitting a (serious) genetic disorder
allows those couples to refrain from having children or to
adapt their reproductive plans (using prenatal or preimplan-
tation diagnosis, donor gametes, or adoption). Ethical issues
concern the possible objectives of providing these options
through preconception genetic counseling or screening,
objections to abortion and embryo-selection, concerns about
eugenics and medicalization, and issues arising in the pro-
fessional–client relationship and/or in the light of the nor-
mative framework for population screening. Although
enhancing reproductive autonomy rather than prevention
should be regarded as the primary aim of preconception
care for genetic risks, directive counseling may well be
acceptable in exceptional cases, and prevention in the sense
of avoiding serious suffering may be an appropriate objec-
tive of specific community-based preconception screening
programmes. The seemingly unavoidable prospect of com-
prehensive preconception screening raises further ethical
issues.
Introduction
Preconception care aims to provide prospective parents infor-
mation and support with regard to preconception measures
that are conducive to a healthy pregnancy-outcome for mother
and child (Health Council of the Netherlands 2007; Atrash et
al. 2008). Experience with preconception care as a systematic
approach to promoting reproductive health is still limited, as is
ethical thinking about conditions and implications. Precon-
ception care then is a practice in the making, still looking for
its own identity (Delvoye et al. 2009).
This article gives an overview of ethical issues related to
offering preconception care to address genetic risks in re-
production. When targeted to couples with a known or
suspected increased risk of having a child with a genetic
disorder, genetic preconception care fits within the tradition
of individual genetic testing and counseling. It provides
counselees with a wider range of reproductive options than
they would otherwise have had (Solomon et al. 2008). On
the basis of their genetic risk-profile and in the light of their
personal weighing of relevant considerations, they may
decide to 1) have a child while accepting the risk, 2) repro-
duce with the use of donor gametes, 3) refrain from having
children genetically related to at least one of the partners, 4)
establish a pregnancy and then use prenatal diagnosis (PD)
with the possibility of having a selective abortion, or 5)
conceive through in vitro fertilization (IVF) and use pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) with the hope of
being able to select a non-affected embryo.
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When however offered to a whole population of repro-
ductive age, genetic preconception care seeks primarily to
identify couples or individuals with an increased risk of
transmitting a genetic disorder. The basic format is taking
an extensive family history as part of general preconception
consultation (Health Council of the Netherlands 2007). In
most cases, this will not reveal a high risk of transmitting a
serious autosomal recessive disease, such as cystic fibrosis
(CF) or hemoglobinopathies. Indeed, due to the recessive
inheritance pattern, affected children tend to be born to
healthy and unsuspecting parents, even if the diseases in
question may constitute a serious reproductive health problem
in specific populations or communities where they are more
frequent. The systematic and uninvited offer of testing for
carrier status of such diseases may therefore become an im-
portant instrument of genetic preconception care (Solomon et
al. 2008). Experience with this approach also includes X-
linked recessive diseases, notably Fragile X syndrome (FXS)
(Musci and Moyer 2010). In the two main sections of this
paper we review the ethics both of individual preconception
genetic counseling and of systematically offering preconcep-
tion carrier screening (PCS) to couples or individuals of
reproductive age, either targeting specific diseases or using
expanded (potentially even genome wide) test-panels.
Ethics of individual preconception genetic counseling
Ethical issues of preconception counseling of individual
couples with a known or suspected increased genetic risk
include the objectives of genetic counseling, the ethics of
abortion and embryo-selection, and issues arising with re-
gard to the professional–client relationship.
Objectives of individual preconception genetic counseling
There are two different views of the aim of preconception
care for individual couples with increased genetic risk:
prevention and autonomy (Buchanan et al. 2000; De Wert
1999). According to what we will refer to as the ‘prevention
view’, the provision of information and counseling (and
testing) to these couples aims at preventing the birth of
children with (severe) genetic disorders. This may be moti-
vated by an ethical (prevention of suffering) or a health
economic (reducing societal costs) concern, or by both.
Both versions of the prevention view fit in with the notion
of preconception care as a general means for promoting
healthy pregnancy outcomes for mother and child.
The dominant view with regard to reproductive counseling
in clinical genetics, however, is that this practice serves the
quite different end of enhancing opportunities for meaningful
reproductive choice (‘autonomy view’) (De Wert and De
Wachter 1990). The ethical argument for this position is that
reproductive decisions are and should remain personal and
that this is difficult to reconcile with treating them as means to
achieving societal goals. This view holds that under the pre-
vention perspective, there is a risk that prospective parents will
be expected to make the ‘right’ decisions and that it will
become normal and logical to hold them accountable for the
consequences if they do not. This is especially regarded as
problematic where abortion decisions are concerned. The only
way to avoid pressure on pregnant women and their partners
to test for fetal abnormalities and to terminate affected preg-
nancies would be to clearly distinguish between enhancing
reproductive autonomy as the aim of genetic counseling on
the one hand and avoiding the birth of affected children as a
possible consequence on the other. Of course, this notion
of enhancing reproductive autonomy must be qualified as
focused on decision making with regard to (serious)
health problems in prospective children (Health Council
of the Netherlands 2001). Without this qualification, the
question might arise why prenatal testing should not also
be offered for sex selection, or even to enable deaf
parents to abort a hearing child.
Moral acceptability of embryo-selection and abortion
As genetic counseling may lead to discarding embryos (after
IVF/PGD) and to aborting foetuses (after PD), a central
issue concerns the moral acceptability of these options. This
debate turns on the ‘moral status’ of human embryos and
foetuses (De Wert 1999; Knoppers et al. 2009). On one end
of the range of possible positions, there is the view that they
are to be regarded as persons with a corresponding near
absolute right to protection—a view which is difficult to
reconcile with societal acceptance of e.g. intra-uterine devices.
On the other end, some argue that embryos and foetuses are
just tissues and cells with no moral status whatsoever. In
between these more extreme positions, most argue that human
embryos and foetuses have a real, but relatively low moral
status, which can be overridden by other morally relevant
considerations, including the wish to avoid transmitting a
(serious) genetic disorder to one’s children (Health Council
of the Netherlands 2001; Knoppers et al. 2006).
For those who accept the idea of ‘gradualism’—meaning
that the status of the embryo and foetus increases with its
development—embryo-selection will be morally preferable
over abortion, and earlier abortion over later (De Wert 2009;
Knoppers et al. 2006). In this light, early PD by means of
non-invasive testing in maternal blood may be seen as a
morally important new development (De Jong et al. 2010).
Moreover, many would find abortion even for ‘medical
reasons’ only acceptable up to foetal viability or to some
other limit related to the notion of increasing moral status
(Boonin 2003). These lines may or may not correspond with
legal abortion-limits as drawn in different jurisdictions.
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Responsible practice: informed decision making
and the limits of non-directivity
In the context of reproductive counseling, the option of
genetic testing of the counselee(s) (and/or close relatives)
will often be proposed in order to obtain a more accurate
view of the transmission risk. Such testing requires the
voluntary and informed consent of the person to be tested
(Knoppers et al. 2006). This requires professionals to pro-
vide adequate (balanced and sufficient) pre-test information
about the aim and nature of the test, the test procedure, and
the meaning and implications of possible outcomes. In-
formed consent is not an end in itself, but a means to enable
autonomous decision making. This is more strongly empha-
sized in the notion of ‘informed choice’: the person to whom
testing is offered must be helped to make his or her own
weighing of the pros and cons, also taking account of
possible psychosocial implications, and making a fit with
his or her personal values and beliefs (Marteau et al. 2001).
This account of informed decision making is closely relat-
ed to the ideal of professional non-directivity (De Wert 1999).
In the context of reproductive counseling, this requires pro-
fessionals to create a climate in which those ‘at risk’ can make
their own decisions, not just about testing, but also with regard
to choosing reproductive options. Directive counseling is
generally regarded as problematic in this context, given that
peoplemay have very different views about what reproductive
risks are acceptable (Wertz and Knoppers 2002).
Still, there are situations where advising counselees to
avoid reproductive risks may well be appropriate. One should
think here of cases where both the chances of having an
affected child and the level of suffering and harm for those
having the disease are high. An example would be a couple
with a child-wish where the woman is a known carrier of
Duchenne muscular dystrophy (DMD). Given the X-linked
inheritance pattern, this means that their risk of having a child
with DMD is 25%: if the child is a boy, one in two will have
this very serious disease that strikes already at an early age.
What if this couple makes clear that because of their views
about abortion and embryo-selection, they would not want to
have prenatal or preimplantation genetic diagnosis? Would
advising them not to take the risk of having a child with
DMD (but opt for IVF with donor oocytes, try to have a child
through adoption, or refrain from having children) be an
instance of disrespecting the counselees’ right to reproductive
autonomy? We do not agree. We think that thus advising the
couple may in fact be understood as taking them seriously as
autonomous and therefore responsible agents in the parental
role they want to assume. When taking a directive stance in
such situations, counselors should of course limit their efforts
to rational (non-coercive) persuasion.
Another situation where directivity may be appropriate
emerges when due to a fertility problem, a couple at a high
risk of transmitting a serious disease (such as DMD) can only
reproduce through medically assisted reproduction. Given
their direct and causal involvement in the realization of the
parental project, fertility doctors have the professional respon-
sibility to refrain from medically assisted reproduction in case
of a high risk of serious harm to the child (ESHRE 2007). It
may therefore be morally appropriate to offer genetic testing
to applicants at risk of having an affected child as a condition
for access to medically assisted reproduction (ESHRE 2011).
Here, appropriate directivity may even go beyond persuasive
advice and take the form of a ‘coercive offer’.
We have suggested that directivity may be appropriate in
cases where reproduction would entail a high risk of serious
harm. Inevitably, there will be different opinions about
where the line between risks that are and are not in this
category must be drawn (Wertz and Knoppers 2002). Ac-
knowledgement of these differences does not stand in the
way of maintaining that there are moral limits to the ideal of
non-directivity. What it does entail, however, is that there is
a grey area in which the justification for directive counseling
is far less obvious than in the more extreme cases that would
not lead to much disagreement.
Responsible practice: confidentiality and the interests
of relatives
A further situation where non-directivity cannot be guiding
may emerge when genetic counseling or testing has revealed
that close-relatives of the proband are at a risk of serious,
avoidable harm. In such cases, the counselor should urge the
proband to inform those relatives (or to take steps in order to
have them informed by somebody else). But what if the
proband refuses and is also not willing to discharge the
professional of her duties of confidentiality? It has been
suggested that not the individual, but the family should be
taken as the ‘unit of confidentiality’ (Lucassen 2007). How-
ever, this ‘solution’ is rejected in most of the relevant ethical
and legal literature (Clarke 2007; Knoppers 2002; Offit et al.
2004). The principle remains that only when facing a con-
flict of duties, professionals may inform a patient’s or cli-
ent’s relatives without his or her consent (Lacroix et al.
2008). This requires a delicate weighing of relevant consid-
erations (President’s Commission 1983). Criteria include the
following: all efforts to obtain consent have failed; the
situation must amount to a case of conscience; not inform-
ing the relatives would probably lead to serious harm or
suffering; and the inroad upon the patient’s or client’s pri-
vacy is kept as small as possible.
Cascade screening
A final issue regards the systematic offering of genetic
testing to relatives of the proband. Such ‘cascade screening’
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may be an effective strategy to identify persons at risk both of
having and transmitting genetic disorders that because of their
autosomal dominant inheritance pattern are highly frequent in
affected families (Morris 2004). This includes diseases such as
hypercholesterolemia (Newson and Humphries 2005) and
hereditary cardiac arrythmias (Hofman et al. 2010). Cascade
screening has also been considered for Fragile X syndrome
(Morris 2004; De Jong and De Wert 2005). In the context of
preconception care, cascade screening is intermediate between
counseling and testing of individual couples with a known or
suspected increased genetic risk (this section) and genetic
screening as offered to all those of reproductive age (see next
section). Offering cascade screening in affected families has
been criticized because of its uninvited nature and the possible
invasion that this may entail of the ‘right not to know’ of
individual family members. However, depending on the dis-
ease in question and the amount of harm that a timely warning
could help to avert, the ‘right to know’ of family members at
risk may well be the morally overriding consideration (De
Wert 2005).
Preconception carrier screening
Ethical issues with regard to PCS include preliminary con-
cerns about eugenics, medicalization, and discrimination,
the objectives of offering PCS, and issues arising in view
of the normative framework for population screening. We
will end this section with a brief discussion of the possible
future expansion towards comprehensive PCS.
Eugenics, medicalization, discrimination?
PCS is more controversial than individual genetic counsel-
ing. Critics object for different but related reasons to the fact
that in this approach genetic preconception care is meant to
serve the reproductive health of the population as a whole.
Why would that be problematic? Some are concerned about
a supposed resurgence of ‘eugenics’ (Scully 2008); others
speak of ‘medicalization’ (Verweij 1999). However, as those
terms have many different meanings, it seems more fruitful
to ask what scenarios people actually fear and to assess the
likelihood of those scenarios (Bouffard et al. 2009; Paul
1994). For instance, people may think of government
restrictions of reproductive freedom, as in Nazi Germany.
That scenario, however, is quite implausible, at least in
Western democratic societies. Fears about societal pressure
to participate in screening or to choose specific reproductive
options seem more realistic. But that should be taken as a
reason for developing and implementing an appropriate
system of safeguards, not as a ground for categorically
opposing this form of preconception care (De Wert and De
Wachter 1990). We will return to this when discussing the
normative framework for PCS.
Another issue is the ‘disability rights’ critique. The so-
called ‘expressivist argument’ states that taking measures to
avoid the birth of a child with a specific disorder or disability
expresses a discriminatory view regarding the worth of the life
of those living with such conditions (Parens and Asch 2000).
If taken as a claim about parental motives this cannot be
maintained. Prospective parents may want to protect their
child from harm, or they may feel that they would not be able
to be good parents for a (severely) disabled child. None of
these motives expresses a discriminatory attitude towards
disabled persons (Knoppers et al. 2006). But the argument
may also be directed against the systematic offer of reproduc-
tive testing for specific diseases. Does this not send the mes-
sage that persons with the diseases screened for are a burden to
society and would better not be born (Scully 2008)? There is
certainly a risk that PCS may lead to reinforcing existing
tendencies of stigmatization and discrimination (Wilfond
and Fost 1990). Here again, much depends on how the
programme is presented and conducted in practice.
Objectives of offering PCS
As a form of reproductive screening, it would seem that PCS
is better compared with autonomy-directed prenatal screen-
ing for Down syndrome and other foetal anomalies, than
with prevention-directed screening for, eg, breast-cancer
(Dondorp et al. 2010). Indeed, the arguments behind the
strong emphasis on reproductive autonomy in the clinical
genetics tradition seem equally relevant when PCS is
concerned. However, there may be some room for differen-
tiation between PCS as a top-down initiative from the health
care system (as in the case of the recently introduced oblig-
atory offer of PCS for CF in the USA; ACOG 2011) and
community-based initiatives targeting high profile genetic
risks for serious diseases within that specific community or
population. Whereas reduced birth rates of affected children
should not be regarded as the measure of success of the
former type of programmes, doing so may seem less prob-
lematic for programmes of the latter kind (Laberge et al.
2010). The difference being that in programmes set up in
answer to a need for prevention as self-defined by a com-
munity in which many families are struck by a high burden
of disease, most participants will actively support the aim of
bringing down the birth-prevalence of the disease, whereas
this is less obvious in top-down programmes aimed at
populations rather than communities. With regard to this
tentative distinction we make the following comments.
Firstly, the material (genetic risk and burden of the disease)
and procedural (community involvement) criteria would
require further exploration. Clearly, a high population fre-
quency of an untreatable, debilitating and lethal disease such
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as Tay Sachs Disease (TSD) would amount to a high risk of
serious harm. And it would seem that the same can also be
said of β thalassemia in regions and countries where that
disease is highly frequent, even though it is amenable to
some form of treatment. But for diseases that are less serious
or highly variable or well treatable, enabling autonomous
choices rather than prevention should be the objective of
PCS. Where the line would have to be drawn is a matter for
further debate, involving the participation of the relevant
communities themselves. The procedural criterion of
bottom-up community involvement and support would also
require more precise determination. Secondly, although this
brings in the prevention view, it is prevention as primarily
motivated by the community’s concern about the suffering
of its children and families, rather than by health economic
considerations. Finally, to say that prevention may under con-
ditions be a morally legitimate objective of community-based
PCS is not to deny that pressure on individuals or couples is a
concern also in those contexts. Especially in socially tight
communities, pressure to participate in prevention-aimed
PCS is far from imaginable, and safeguards are needed to
avoid this (see next subsection).
Normative framework
For the normative assessment of population screening pro-
grammes, a general framework of criteria has been devel-
oped (Dondorp et al. 2010; Health Council of the
Netherlands 1994). At the core of this framework, there is
a requirement of proportionality: there must be a proven
positive balance of benefits over harms for those participat-
ing. Whether this requirement is met can only be determined
on the basis of scientific evidence regarding many separate
aspects including the natural history of the disease, how
screening may provide meaningful options for changing an
otherwise dreadful outcome, and possible psychosocial
implications. Further criteria refer to test characteristics,
quality issues, cost-effectiveness etc. It is also stressed that
participation must be voluntary and based on informed
choice.
There is strong consensus that some PCS programmes
meet these criteria, whereas some other programmes do not,
or less clearly. For instance, with regard to PCS for Fragile-
X syndrome (FXS) there are concerns that may affect over-
all proportionality (De Jong and De Wert 2002; Musci and
Moyer 2010). First, it is not always clear as to whether women
carry an unstable allele which may cause FXS in offspring—
think, for example, of ‘intermediate’ alleles in the grey zone.
Such findings change the nature of carrier screening for FXS
into a form of risk assessment screening, potentially inducing
higher levels of anxiety and complicating decision making.
Second, unlike other carrier screening programmes, screening
for fragile-X carriers will identify individuals who themselves
are at risk for adult-onset disorders, more in particular prema-
ture ovarian failure (POF) and fragile-X-associated tremor and
ataxia syndrome (FXTAS). And third, phenotype prediction in
female foetuses with a full mutation is difficult, if not impos-
sible. Cascade screening may be a more acceptable approach
to identify female carriers of FXS (De Jong and DeWert 2002;
De Wert 2005). An important advantage being that one starts
from (a patient with) a disease-causing allele, allowing for
more straightforward genetic counseling.
With regard to PCS for CF, the apparent lack of interna-
tional consensus is reflected in a recent European consensus
document that only provides a template for further debate
(Castellani et al. 2010). The reasons behind this include the
fact that due to the large number of CFTR mutations, CF
carrier tests have a less than perfect sensitivity and also that
for many mutations the genotype–phenotype correlation is
weak. However, in a Dutch study, it was found that PCS for
CF would in principle fulfil the requirements of the norma-
tive framework (Henneman et al. 2002).
Screening in the context of reproduction is especially
sensitive as it may affect decision making with regard to
having or avoiding to have children with a disease or dis-
ability. It is far from imaginable that as a result of offering
such screening, these choices will come under pressure as to
what professionals or society would like to see happen. That
is indeed the concern behind the charges of eugenics and
medicalization briefly discussed in the beginning of this
section. As suggested, the only way to answer this is
through safeguards that protect reproductive freedom. Some
of those safeguards will need to be integrated in the set-up of
the programme. These include adequate provisions for en-
suring voluntary, well-informed decision making regarding
participation in PCS, the availability of non-directive
counseling (within the limits earlier referred to), and a
systematic evaluation aimed at identifying and removing
elements of unjustified directivity. Other safeguards will
have to be of a societal nature, including the continued
availability and funding of proper health care services for
children born with the diseases targeted in PCS, also when
their parents had the option to choose to avoid their birth
(Human Genetics Commission 2011).
Modes of offering carrier screening
Carrier screening may be offered either in pregnancy or pre-
conceptionally, and if preconceptionally, either to couples
with possible reproductive plans or to all individuals of (pre-
)reproductive age. Which of these approaches is more in line
with the proportionality requirement of the normative frame-
work will to a large extent also depend on whether prevention
or autonomy is taken as the overarching objective.
In terms of enabling reproductive choices, carrier screen-
ing in pregnancy is clearly suboptimal. Prenatal carrier
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screening leaves couples found to be at a 1:4 risk of having a
child with a serious disease no other options than either
accept that risk or opt for PD and a possible abortion.
Moreover, it forces them to start thinking about this under
time pressure in what is already an emotionally charged
period. Organizationally, however, the preconception ap-
proach is more challenging. Pregnant women and their
partners are easier to find than couples with possible repro-
ductive plans. As proposed by the Health Council of the
Netherlands, the introduction of a general preconception
consultation might help to create a context for the offer of
PCS (Health Council of the Netherlands 2007). Since not all
couples will be reached preconceptionally, a combination of
both approaches may be optimal: offering prenatal carrier
screening as a back-up to couples who for whatever reason
did not participate in PCS.
PCS is usually offered to couples rather than to non-
committed individuals. It is couples who have more immi-
nent reproductive plans, and it is as couples that they may be
found to be at a high risk of having a child with an autoso-
mal recessive disease. But couples can be regarded and
approached in different ways: either as single units or as
unions of two separate individuals (Castellani et al. 2010).
The single unit approach aims at informing the partners
jointly about whether or not they are a carrier couple. In
case of a discordant outcome, individual carrier status is not
always reported. This deprives a possible carrier of the
option of informing his or her relatives and of using this
information in a future relation with another partner (Modra
et al. 2010). Withholding this information is legally ques-
tionable and at odds with the objective of enhancing repro-
ductive autonomy. Nor does it seem that being identified as
a carrier has a more than transient psychological impact on
well-informed testees (Lakeman et al. 2008).
The alternative approach of regarding the couple as a
union of two individuals entails simultaneous testing of both
partners and providing information about all individual out-
comes. Drawbacks are that this doubles the costs of testing
and leads to the identification of twice-as many discordant
couples. In PCS for CF, this outcome requires careful
counseling in the light of the fact that the risk for these
couples has increased as a result of testing (Ten Kate et al.
1996).
PCS is sometimes also offered in non-clinical settings
(workplace, school) to individual adults or to adolescents, as
candidate participants may thus be more easily and effec-
tively reached. It has been argued that from an ethical point
of view, this approach has the benefit of ensuring equity of
access (Modra et al. 2010). Offering PCS to adolescents
means educating their parents as well, leading to an in-
creased awareness in the population as a whole.
One concern with addressing individuals is that it might
lead to stigmatization and lack of self-esteem of those found
to be carriers within the community. That this is not un-
imaginable has been illustrated in a recent analysis of the
orthodox Jewish Dor Yeshorim PCS programme (Raz and
Vizner 2008). However, much seems to depend on how the
screening is offered and what information is given (Modra et
al. 2010). Proper education about the meaning of being a
carrier is of course crucial. This should also include the fact
that in terms of carrier status for recessive disease, we are
indeed all ‘fellow mutants’. Clearly, society needs to be
educated about this as well: identification of carriers and
patients led to the erroneous rejection of carriers by Amer-
ican insurance companies in the early 1970s.
Another concern regards the voluntariness of participa-
tion, especially when PCS is offered to adolescents (Barlow-
Stewart et al. 2003). The UK Human Genetics Commission
recently recommended that offering PCS to adolescents may
be acceptable under strict conditions protecting their auton-
omy rights (Human Genetics Commission 2011). Still, one
may object that the trade-off between the relevance of test-
ing to the young person (increasing as they grow and come
closer to the time that they may wish to start a family) and
the ease of population coverage (becoming progressively
less complete, or more costly, as the age of the target group
increases) is risky in view of less favourable conditions for
voluntary and truly informed participation.
Expanding testpanels
Traditionally, PCS regarded one single disease. In the last
years, however, there is a tendency of using test panels for
several diseases. A recent PCS pilot in Quebec, Canada, is
directed at four diseases with a high frequency in the population
(1:5) due to a historic founder effect (Charlevoix–Saguenay
spastic ataxia; peripheral neuropathy with or without agenesis
of corpus callosum; lactic acidosis COX deficiency; and hered-
itary tyrosinemia type 1) (personal communication Dr. Claude
Laberge, Quebec). The best example of expansion of traditional
programmes is PCS offered to the Ashkenazi community;
originally focused on TSD only, it presently includes up to 16
genetic disorders, an expansion which seems to be strongly
supported by the community (Scott et al. 2010). Expanding
testpanels with diseases that, although less frequent in the
relevant population, are serious and without meaningful treat-
ment options sounds reasonable, provided that genotype–phe-
notype relations are well understood and good-quality tests are
available. However, there is debate about whether expanded
panels should also include lower-penetrance mutations, where
disease severity is difficult to predict and homozygotes may
well remain asymptomatic. An example from the group of 16
diseases just referred to is type 1 Gaucher Disease (GD), which
not only has a low-penetrance and variable expression, but for
which effective treatment is also available (Zuckerman et al.
2007). It is clear that if PCS is to be offered for such diseases,
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the rationale will have to be the provision of autonomous
choice rather than the prevention perspective governing tradi-
tional PCS in the Ashkenazi community. Mixing the two
perspectives in one programme is morally risky as this might
send the message that also minor health problems are to be
avoided by responsible reproductive decisions (Raz and Vizner
2008).
Driven by technological developments, expansion of
PCS seems unavoidable. New techniques, such as the use
of DNA chips and next generation sequencing, will allow
carrier status to be simultaneously determined for many more
recessive conditions than are included in current screening
programmes, without significantly increasing the costs. Amer-
ican researchers recently reported to have developed a PCS
test for no less than 448 severe recessive childhood diseases
(Bell et al. 2011). The question is whether such ‘comprehen-
sive’ PCS will fulfill the criteria for responsible screening. For
each of the separate conditions this will depend onwhether the
relevant mutations are known, on what is known about the
disease and genotype–phenotype correlations, and whether a
good quality diagnostic test is available. Introducing carrier
screening that would lead to couples making far-reaching
reproductive decisions on the basis of test results of which
the implications are not yet fully understood is morally unac-
ceptable. Another concern regards the quality of informed
consent. The introduction of genome-wide testing questions
the feasibility of informed consent as traditionally understood
and urges society to consider the acceptability of so-called
generic consent, where applicants are only more generally
informed about types of possible test outcomes and their
implications (Dondorp and De Wert 2010).
Concluding remarks
A core thread of this paper is that there are good moral
reasons for regarding the enhancement of reproductive au-
tonomy rather than prevention as the primary objective both
of individual preconception genetic counseling and of PCS.
Nevertheless, we have argued that there may be room for
differentiation in both contexts. In exceptional cases where
reproduction entails a high risk of serious harm, individual
counseling may well be directive. Similarly, prevention in
the sense of avoiding serious suffering may under condi-
tions be a morally acceptable objective of PCS. Prevention
in this sense should be distinguished from prevention aimed
at cost reduction for the health care system. Where PCS is
offered for reasons of cost reduction, reproductive freedom
is under threat of being curtailed for purely health economic
considerations, possibly leading to pressure to also avoid the
birth of children with minor or treatable disorders. In this
connection, the prospect of comprehensive PCS is worri-
some, because it neither makes an easy fit with the objective
of enabling meaningful reproductive choices nor with pre-
vention as aimed at serious suffering. As Clarke and Thirl-
away (2011) have recently warned, comprehensive PCS as
an instrument of cost-reduction, with targets of near univer-
sal compliance also with regard to termination of affected
pregnancies, may be regarded as attractive by state health-
care systems ‘in countries with young populations, rising
expectations and limited resources’. In Western countries, a
more subtle scenario seems more likely: broad-scope PCS
may be sold to the public under the banner of giving people
choices, but without caring much about whether those
choices are real and meaningful (Dondorp and De Wert
2010). The best way of challenging these possible scenarios
is through investing in the counter scenario of PCS pro-
grammes in which the autonomy-objective is allowed to be
a practice-shaping force, rather than just a banner or a
slogan.
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